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Theology in the University 
Gerard Loughlin 
Durham University 
 
 
Theology has no place in the university of the twenty-first century. She is out of 
place in such a place, a pre-enlightenment relic, an uncomfortable reminder of what the 
modern university was meant to abolish. As long ago as 1772, Baron d’Holbach, in Le 
Bon Sens, declared the ‘science’ of theology to be ‘a continual insult to human reason’,i 
and reason is the bedrock of the modern university, which is home to all true science. 
Theology is no science at all but a chimera of the imagination,ii an aberration in the place 
that banishes all such fantasies. Immanuel Kant, in his late satire, The Conflict of the 
Faculties (1798), was less dismissive than d’Holbach, allowing theology her queenly 
place in the university, with even philosophy as a handmaid. But whether carrying ‘her 
lady’s torch before or her train behind’ he would not say.iii 
D’Holbach’s antipathy to religion is still with us more than two-hundred-and-fifty 
years later. Richard Dawkins still opposes science to religion, reason to faith.iv Though 
Dawkins, as the Charles Simonyi Professor of the Public Understanding of Science at 
Oxford, teaches in a university of medieval foundation, he rightly understands it as 
committed to the tenets of the modern research university, the idea of which came into 
being at the turn of the eighteenth century, and was given form in the University of Berlin 
(1810). Wilhelm von Humboldt is usually credited with establishing Berlin University, 
but he gave form to ideas that were generally abroad and had already affected the 
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universities of Halle (1694) and Göttingen (1737). These were the ideas of enlightened 
men like d’Holbach, but more importantly of Kant, Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Friedrich 
Schleiermacher. It is one of the ironies of this story that the man who would become the 
father of modern theology was himself responsible for securing the very institution that, 
while it was required to teach theology, was ideologically disposed to despise the 
theology it taught as at best unscientific and at worst superstition.v Yet Schleiermacher 
did secure theology a place in the research university, if at a price. 
The price that theology paid was to become like its fellow disciplines, a scientific 
servant of the state. Theology became wissenschaftliche Theologie and its primary role 
was the preparation of pastors for service in the national church, ‘tools of government’ 
contracted to teach what the government wanted.vi Of course this arrangement was not 
unique. Church and state were also conjoined in England, with university theology 
serving the one through the other, providing clerics for the shepherding of the monarch’s 
subjects.vii And theology had always considered herself a science, indeed the regina 
scientiarum. But as such she was an Aristotelian undertaking, working from axioms she 
had received.viii Modern science is an altogether different creature. Enlightenment 
Wissenschaft was answerable to nothing other than reason, which is ‘by its nature free 
and admits of no command to hold something as true (no imperative “Believe!” but only 
a free credo).’ix Moreover, it sought to understand all things through understanding the 
‘principles and foundations of all knowledge.’x It sought a total, unified comprehension, 
an encyclopaedic science.xi 
That which reason taught was at first less restricted than it later became. 
Wissenschaft included the social sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) along with the natural, 
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and could encompass any discipline that aspired to ‘rigorous, systematic enquiry’.xii It 
was only as the nineteenth century progressed that the ambit of Wissenschaft was 
increasingly restricted to those ‘hard’ sciences that disdained tradition, being solely 
governed by reason and experience (repeatable experiment), and pretending to 
Voraussetzungslosigkeit (presuppositionlessness).xiii Many have pointed out that there is 
no thinking without presupposition, that reason requires some kind of faith in order to get 
a purchase on the world.xiv But this would be of little avail to theology in the modern 
university. Theology ceased to be a science when ‘science’ became an ideology. 
Theology kept its place in the university, but only by becoming something other 
than it had been.xv As Wissenschaft it still served the church, but through a state 
organisation. It still answered to the church’s faith, but as a science that sought to know 
the mind of God through a self-sufficient reason. It refused ‘unfathomable mystery’. That 
last is Fichte at the beginning of the nineteenth century, who held that there was no place 
in the university for a science that could not understand and penetrate ‘to its ultimate 
ground’ that which it was given to think.xvi At the end of the century, Adolf von Harnack 
would welcome theology’s separation from the church, as only thus enabled to 
‘contribute to the edifice of modern German science and culture.’xvii We may think that 
the scientific refiguration of theology has itself been refigured, or was weakened or never 
took hold in many universities. But for some that which university theology has become 
is so unlike what it was and should be that it has ceased to be theology at all. Most 
forcefully, Gavin D’Costa declares that university theology is a masquerade. ‘Theology, 
properly understood, cannot be taught and practiced within the modern university.’xviii In 
this D’Costa agrees with the French philosophes and the German idealists. 
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In the light of this story it is instructive to turn from Prussia to Britain, and from 
Protestant to Catholic theology, and again consider John Henry Newman’s adventures in 
the idea and practice of the university. For unlike those who think that theology has no 
place in the university, or at least in the modern university,xix Newman argued that there 
is no university where there is no theology. 
 
 
Mixed Education 
 
When Newman wrote on the university he treated of its ‘essence’.xx But he also 
wrote about particular universities. He wrote about the university he loved, Oxford; about 
the university he detested, London; and about the university he was to bring into being in 
Dublin. He also had in mind the Catholic University of Louvain (1425; but closed in 
1797 and reopened in 1834), in which he saw a model for Ireland’s Catholic University, 
and with whose rector he was to correspond. It was in April 1851 that Dr Paul Cullen, 
Archbishop of Armagh, wrote to Newman seeking advice on the setting up of a Catholic 
university in Ireland, and invited him to Dublin to give a series of lectures ‘against Mixed 
Education.’xxi Shortly afterwards Cullen met Newman and invited him to become the 
founding rector of the Catholic University of Ireland.xxii Newman accepted, but had to 
wait until 1854 for his formal installation as rector.xxiii 
The lectures that inaugurated the new venture were given on successive Mondays 
in May and early June 1852. The last five were not delivered but published as pamphlets, 
as were the first five, with all of them bound into a book in the following year—though it 
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bore the previous year’s date—and published as Discourses on the Scope of University 
Education (1852). The lectures were written during a period of considerable strain for 
Newman, not only because of the university undertaking but also because of Newman’s 
imminent trial for libel. He was accused of defaming Giacinto Achilli (b.1803)—an ex-
Dominican Don Juan, whose supposed confinement by the Inquisition was presented to 
the English public as the suffering of a Protestant hero at the hands of the old Roman 
enemy, that was again astir with the re-establishment of the Catholic hierarchy in 
November 1850.xxiv Newman feared that his ‘Irish engagement would be completely 
disarranged by a year’s imprisonment.’xxv In the event the trial did not come to court until 
late June, after Newman had delivered the first five of his lectures, but then he had to wait 
until November to be found guilty. However, after failing to secure a retrial, he was only 
fined a hundred pounds; the press generally conceded him the moral victory.xxvi But it 
was throughout this latter period that he was working on the Discourses; the ‘most 
painful of all’ his books to write.xxvii Tellingly it was dedicated to those who through their 
‘prayers and penances … stubborn efforts … [and] munificent alms’ had ‘broken for him 
the stress of a great anxiety.’ 
It is thus a testament to Newman’s facility that his discourses on the university are 
so beguiling. For many, the idea of a university is Newman’s idea. It is one he 
subsequently enlarged as he sought to make the idea a reality. In 1859 he published a 
further ten Lectures and Essays on University Subjects, and it was these he added to the 
earlier discourses—though with the original fifth and appendix of historical examples 
removed—to produce The Idea of a University in 1873.xxviii But by then Newman had 
ceased to be the rector of the Catholic University in Dublin. He had come to feel that he 
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lacked the support of both the Irish and English hierarchies. The University was ‘abused 
in Ireland for being English, and neglected in England for being Irish.’xxix In April 1857 
Newman signalled his intention to resign, and did so on November 12th, 1858. But the 
idea of the university remained even if its shadow faded.xxx 
Newman had been invited to lecture against ‘mixed education’; not against the 
mixing of the sexes, but against the mixing of Catholic and Protestant men.xxxi Newman 
had to address this issue, even if his own interest—and that of later readers—was in the 
university considered ‘in the abstract and in its idea.’xxxii Thus Newman writes 
sometimes of the ‘university’ and sometimes of the ‘Catholic university’, and sometimes 
the distinction is lost to view.xxxiii There is a tension between Newman’s interest in the 
essence of the university, and the demands of the context in which he explored that 
essence. He was required to champion the idea of a Catholic university against the 
background of the Queen’s Colleges, which had been conceived by Robert Peel, and 
established by 1849 in Belfast, Cork and Galway.xxxiv They were state funded and open to 
all. They answered to what Newman saw as the temptation of the Catholic but ‘liberal’ 
statesman. ‘Since his schools cannot have one faith, he determines, as the best choice left 
to him, that they shall have none.’xxxv And in Ireland many lay Catholics and some 
clerics—including until his death in February 1852 the Archbishop of Dublin, Daniel 
Murrayxxxvi—were in favour of the Queen’s Colleges, since what the ‘respectable’ laity 
wanted for their sons was an education that would fit them for professional life,xxxvii while 
many nationalists hoped that the Queen’s Colleges would foster a united Irish culture. 
Newman of course was not opposed to partisan education, having as an Anglican 
defended Oxford’s right to exclude Dissenters when their admittance had been proposed 
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in 1834. But now he was to favour a Catholic partisanship. This he did by arguing for the 
necessity of theology in any university worth the name, and so the necessity for a 
Catholic university, since Catholic theology in a ‘mixed’ university was unthinkable. 
Newman worried about the reception of his argument, but reported the success of his first 
lecture,xxxviii and his pleasant surprise with the ‘great cleverness of the Irish’, which far 
surpassed anything he had seen elsewhere. ‘The very ticket-taker in the room followed 
my arguments, and gave an analysis of the discourse afterwards.’xxxix 
Newman began his argument by defining a university as a place for ‘teaching 
universal knowledge.’xl Many would be unhappy with this definition, which seems to 
suppose a grasp of universal knowledge that is now, if not already in Newman’s day, 
impossible; and which seems to exclude research, and so – today – resource. The first 
concern is easily met, for Newman did not suppose it possible for any one person to gain 
universal knowledge. Nor did he suppose that it was possible for any one university to 
teach it, but allowed that universal knowledge might have to be pursued across a range of 
institutions, and so the lack of a particular subject might not signal a disaster for the 
university. 
But Newman does not allow that a university—a real university—would give up 
on the idea of teaching universal knowledge. Thus if a university lacked some 
departments, it would understand itself to be but a partial realisation of the true 
university, in which ‘all branches of knowledge were presupposed or implied, and none 
omitted on principle.’ 
Newman’s seeming denial of research in the university is more curious, for surely 
all real universities are ‘research universities’, as exemplified by the University of Berlin? 
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But for Newman, the object of the university is the ‘diffusion and extension of knowledge 
rather than the advancement.’ If the object of the university is ‘scientific and 
philosophical discovery,’ why should it have students?xli Newman’s idea of the 
researcher is somewhat arcane, since he imagines a secluded individual, free from the 
distractions of society, living in a cave or tower, or wandering among trees.xlii No doubt 
many professors aspire to such an idyll, and wish for nothing more than to be left alone 
with their laptop and books, but it hardly matches to the requirements of most modern 
research, especially in the social and physical sciences. Nor does it really match with 
either Newman’s imagined university or the actual Catholic University of Ireland, as it 
functioned under Newman’s leadership. For in Newman’s university the student is to 
breathe a ‘pure and clear atmosphere of thought’, which is produced through the 
‘assemblage of learned men’, who, ‘zealous for their own sciences, and rivals of each 
other, are brought, by familiar intercourse and for the sake of intellectual peace, to adjust 
together the claims and relation of their respective subjects of investigation.’xliii It is 
unlikely that such men would not engage in research. And so it proved in the realization 
of Newman’s idea, when, for example, the University’s journal, Atlantis, began to publish 
scientific research in 1858. Indeed, Newman’s idea of the university became so capacious 
that he likened it to the ordered multitudes of the Roman empire, a vast ‘sphere of 
philosophy and research.’xliv 
Newman imagines that knowledge is advanced through the work of institutions 
that may be connected with universities, as subordinate ‘congregations’, but need not be. 
Such independent or semi-independent institutions contemplate science, not students.xlv 
The object of the university, on the other hand, is to take students and turn them into 
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‘something or other’, to mould their characters, form their habits, educate their hearts 
through educating their minds.xlvi The university imparts knowledge, not just for its own 
sake, but also in order to create a ‘culture of the intellect’.xlvii 
Newman did not foresee a time of mass education in Britain, when there would be 
more university students studying theology and religious studies than were studying 
across all subjects in his day, and when more than half of them would be women. 
Newman’s students were to become ‘gentlemen’, shorthand for cultivated minds. 
Newman was concerned with the strengthening, knitting together and toning of boys’ 
intellects; xlviii turning youth into men of ‘good sense, sobriety of thought, reasonableness, 
candour, self-command, and steadiness of view, … entering with comparative ease into 
any subject of thought, and of taking up with aptitude any science or profession.’xlix 
Equipped with these transferable skills, a gentleman would be able to withstand the 
‘random theories and imposing sophistries and dashing paradoxes’ of modern culture, 
promulgated, in Newman’s day, by the ‘periodical literature’.l If we allow that such skills 
are not the preserve of gentlemen alone, then Newman’s vision can still speak to our 
condition. His university is a place where universal knowledge is taught in order to create 
subjects with the skills of divination and discernment, the ability to reason and judge, in 
short, to exercise the ancient virtue of prudence (prudentia), that is still necessary for 
combating contemporary sophistries and seeking out truth.li 
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Theology in Its Place 
 
That the university should make some pretence to universal knowledge would 
seem implicit in its name, Newman suggests, even though its name is more properly 
derived not from the cosmos but from the corporate body of scholars and students in 
which the cosmos is known. But it is a nice conceit, as Newman more or less admits.lii 
The university is to be that place in which the universe is thought, and given this 
aspiration it follows that theology must be one of its subjects, since theology, for 
Newman, is a branch of knowledge. There can be no pruning of the university tree. Thus 
Newman asks if it is ‘logically consistent in a seat of learning to call itself a University 
and to exclude Theology from the number of its studies?’liii Newman of course was aware 
that there were such universities in his day, as in ours.liv But for Newman, a university 
without theology is either trading under a false name or assuming that the ‘province of 
Religion is very barren of real knowledge’.lv 
This of course is the assumption of all who have opposed university theology, 
from d’Holbach to Dawkins. Newman was also aware of a practical atheism amongst 
intellectuals, which he ascribed to a growing tendency to view religion as a matter of 
sentiment rather than reason, a tendency that began with the Protestant Reformation and 
was in his day promulgated by the ‘Liberal or Latitudinarian’. When such a tendency 
prevails it is as unreasonable ‘to demand for Religion a chair in a University, as to 
demand one for fine feeling, sense of honour, patriotism, gratitude, maternal affection, or 
good companionship, proposals which would be simply unmeaning.’lvi Newman had a 
profound, ironic insight into theology’s plight, its reduction to mere opinion in a sceptical 
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climate.lvii Dawkins is hardly more eloquent than Newman in describing the (supposed) 
futility of pursuing the divine: ‘A small insect, a wasp or a fly, is unable to make his way 
through the pane of glass; and his very failure is the occasion of greater violence in his 
struggle than before.’lviii 
Newman was well aware that the object of theological knowledge is of a different 
order from those of other sciences,lix and that the way to such knowledge differs in part 
from the ways of those other sciences, but he was in no doubt that theology is knowledge, 
and so demands its place in the university that teaches universal knowledge. And the 
object of universal knowledge is truth, which Newman glosses as ‘facts and their 
relations, which stand towards each other pretty much as subjects and predicates in logic’. 
These facts include everything, from ‘the internal mysteries of the Divine Essence down 
to our own sensations and consciousness, … from the most glorious seraph to the vilest 
and most noxious of reptiles.’ And all these facts hang together, forming ‘one large 
system or complex fact’, and it is the knowledge of this truth, which the human mind 
seeks to contemplate. We cannot take in this single fact as a whole, but must traverse it 
slowly, short-sightedly, by means of our sciences, which give us ‘partial views or 
abstractions’, which sometimes look to the horizon, and sometimes focus on the ground 
beneath our feet. Moreover, the sciences show us things by showing us their relations, 
and so they never tell us everything that may be told, nor escape the medium of their 
telling.lx 
The labour of knowledge is divided among the sciences, and when ‘certain 
sciences are away’ we have a ‘defective apprehension’ of the truth.lxi All sciences are 
needed for the seeking of truth, in the university where it is sought. Thus Newman’s view 
 12 
is of a unified existence, of creation in relation to its creator, which must be studied by 
us—as particular, limited creatures—through a myriad of interrelated sciences: a truly 
interdisciplinary labour for the truth. And this common labour includes the co-
dependence of theology on other disciplines, through which in part it learns its own 
proper object through their learning of the world that the creator has made and makes to 
be.lxii On Newman’s account, theology does not appear as the ‘queen of the sciences’, but 
as the first amongst equals, for the truth that is to be known in theology is a fundamental 
condition for all knowledge.lxiii When Newman does invoke the idea of a ruling science, 
an architectonic ‘science of sciences’, he gives it the name of philosophy.lxiv This 
philosophy is not so much a body of knowledge, distinct from other sciences, as the caste 
of mind by which those sciences are apprehended and thus united. It is ‘an intellectual … 
grasp of many things brought together in one.’lxv It is not the unity of a general theory of 
everything, but of a community. Indeed, it is the university as such, in its universal scope 
and idea. ‘[I]t is the home, it is the mansion-house, of the goodly family of Sciences, 
sisters all, and sisterly in their mutual dispositions.’lxvi 
 
Not Science only, not Literature only, not Theology only, neither abstract 
knowledge simply nor experimental, neither moral nor material, neither 
metaphysical nor historical, but all knowledge whatever, is taken into account in a 
University, as being the special seat of that large Philosophy, which embraces and 
locates truth of every kind, and every method of attaining it.lxvii 
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But today the university seems a less sisterly place, and even when more sororal, 
theology is the one sister with whom the others are less willing to play. The ‘Liberal or 
Latitudinarian’ view prevails, and theology is seen as at best ‘fine feeling’ and so 
unreasonable in its demand for a university place.lxviii Of course theology has responded 
by becoming less the learning of God and more the learning of the learning of God, the 
history of the texts, beliefs and practices of those who thereby learn God. ‘Religious 
studies’ was precisely developed in order to offer a social-scientific approach to religion 
that would be acceptable in the modern university. And Newman allowed for just such an 
approach, for teaching about religion as a ‘branch of knowledge’.lxix This would be an 
historical rather than doctrinal study, providing the Catholic who was not reading 
theology with a knowledge of his faith sufficient to ‘keep up a conversation’ with 
educated Protestants.lxx By extension this is a ‘religious studies’ that would today fit any 
student with a knowledge of religious peoples, and the problems attendant upon their 
study. But of course Newman also argued for theology proper, for ‘natural’ and 
‘revealed’ theology:lxxi the ‘science of God’.lxxii 
Yet Newman does little to defend his claim that theology is knowledge. He thinks 
it sufficient to note that unbelief rests upon a ‘mere assumption’, that philosophy has yet 
to show the unattainability of ‘religious truth’, and that the onus probandi lies with those 
who think otherwise.lxxiii Newman’s argument for theology in a Catholic university is 
uncontroversial, but he presses to an argument for theology in the university as such,lxxiv 
and for this to have its full force in a world grown wary if not weary of religion, we have 
to press for the university as that place which seeks to ask the question of the universe 
without limit.lxxv Christian faith—as indeed other faiths—presses to this question even 
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though it seemingly already has an answer in God, for ‘God’ is more the name of a 
question than of an answer. ‘God’ is a name for the final incomprehensibility of the 
universe, for the mystery of existence as such, when recognized as such;lxxvi and that this 
mystery comes to us, and for us, in Jesus, is the venture of the ‘research project’ named 
‘church’. To exclude the rigorous thinking of this venture from the university would be to 
exclude a tradition of knowledge from the very place that aspires—or should aspire—to 
think the totality of the given.lxxvii 
 
 
The University without an Idea 
 
Today universities are very different from those that Newman knew and 
imagined. Today they are more likely to teach ‘Shakespeare and Milton’ than ‘Virgil and 
Horace’.lxxviii Today they admit women and are urged to be engines of social mobility. 
But in other ways they are surprisingly similar. They still train up people for the 
government and judiciary, the clubs that rule a country. And remarkably nearly all are 
examples of what was once London University’s prerogative, the university as ‘bazaar, or 
pantechnicon’,lxxix enticing students with the variety and mix of its wares. Today’s 
university no longer offers a unified education, for there is little consensus as to what this 
might entail, little sense of a shared culture for which it might fit people. Today 
universities offer vocational courses, but little or no sense of vocation, of being called to 
a way of life, let alone a way of life for others, and through others for God. Today 
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universities seek merely to meet the tastes of their customers and the whims of their 
paymasters. Today the university lies in ruins. 
This at least is the view of Bill Readings, who argues that the university of 
excellence has replaced that of culture—Newman’s university—and that of reason, from 
which Newman’s idea emerged.lxxx The university of excellence is the university without 
an idea, since it pursues only excellence rather than any excellent thing. Excellence as 
such is a null category, and so answers to the interests of global capital, which turns all it 
touches into the means of its own acceleration. The university of culture served the 
interests of the state, inculcating a national culture that it both formed and reflected. But 
with the decline of the nation-state and the rise of transnational corporations and 
multiculturalism there is little by way of any agreed culture to reproduce,lxxxi and the 
civilization that Newman linked with the West is now utterly mercantile.lxxxii For 
Newman the university exists to form discerning minds, and the study by which this is 
done is not as important as its doing, though Newman favoured the arts, the classics, 
since their efficacy for the ‘real and proper cultivation of the mind’ is shown by ‘long 
experience’ while that of the ‘experimental sciences’ is yet to be proved.lxxxiii But now no 
university aspires to cultivate its students, but to make them as flexible as the market 
requires, by fitting them with the requisite skills for the ‘knowledge economy’. The 
university tempts with the promise of increased earnings, and is itself judged by its 
contribution to the flourishing of the market. Research is judged by its profitability. 
Capital is now the universal that the university serves. 
Stanley Fish agrees with Readings’ analysis, but unlike Readings he welcomes the 
university of excellence.lxxxiv For all ideas can flourish in the university without an idea, 
 16 
and as an administrator, Fish’s role is to see that they flourish excellently. But beyond 
that he has no preferences, no idea as to what the university is for. His motto: ‘Have 
skills, Will Travel.’lxxxv And in such a context, theology no longer has to justify itself. It 
just has to do what it does excellently.lxxxvi The enlightenment project is vanquished in the 
university without an idea. For all truths (and falsehoods) may be spoken when truth has 
no value, and only money matters.lxxxvii But this then is the objection that Stanley 
Hauerwas raises against Fish’s blithe acceptance of the postmodern condition: that he 
elides the university’s complicity in producing subjects for the modern state and 
corporate interest.lxxxviii The university without an idea becomes a university without 
questioning. 
There is a sense in which Newman envisaged a university without an idea, but 
never one without questioning. Newman said that if he had to choose between a 
university that awarded degrees for knowledge gained and a university that simply 
brought ‘young men together for three or four years’, he would choose the latter; the 
university that ‘did nothing’.lxxxix For such a university—as Oxford showed—better 
produces men of natural virtue, business acumen and cultivated taste; it better produces 
men who can ‘subdue the earth’ and ‘domineer over Catholics’.xc This is a university that 
reproduces a culture through association; but in the ideal university—in Dublin rather 
than Oxford—the culture reproduced is also one of questioning, of learning to see and say 
things as they are, ‘of discriminating between truth and falsehood, … of arranging things 
according to their real value, and … of building up ideas.’xci In this Newman is as much a 
father to the university of culture as he is to the university envisaged by thinkers as 
different as Bill Readings and Alasdair MacIntyre. 
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Readings’ vision of the university is bleak, since for him the national cultures 
(English or Irish) that Newman’s universities reproduced are no more, or fast 
disappearing, and there is no possibility of giving ‘culture back its reason’, of retrieving 
the Wissenschaft that was to unify a people through totalising its knowledge.xcii We 
necessarily live amongst the ruins of the past, and so the university becomes the question 
of those ruins, the place where culture and the university itself are in question, where 
‘we’ are in question.xciii The university becomes a ‘dissensual community’, where 
traditions of enquiry are pursued beside one another, in dialogue with one another, but 
without the illusion of ‘transparent communication’, of an identity already achieved.xciv 
The university is not an ‘ideal speech situation’. Unlike Newman, Readings will not say 
that the university pursues truth (though he would have it pursue the truth of our 
dissensus), but his blunt assertion that the business of the university is ‘evaluation, 
judgement and self-questioning’xcv recalls Newman’s cultivation of discernment. 
Moreover Readings’ understanding of people has a religious ring to it, as he himself 
notes.xcvi People, for Readings, are given as singularities within networks of infinite 
obligation, to the extent that they are even responsible for the acts of their forebears.xcvii 
This gives Readings’ university a decidedly ‘ethical atmosphere’,xcviii and seems to 
suggest that even a university of dissensus might constitute a kind of culture. 
Alasdair MacIntyre has a similarly bleak view of our condition, and a surprisingly 
similar account of the university as a place of learned disagreement. For MacIntyre the 
university is ‘where conceptions of and standards of rational justification are elaborated, 
put to work in the detailed practices of enquiry, and themselves rationally evaluated, so 
that only from the university can the wider society learn how to conduct its own debates, 
 18 
practical or theoretical, in a rationally defensible way.’ And for this the university must 
be a place ‘where rival and antagonistic views of rational justification … are afforded the 
opportunity both to develop their own enquiries, in practice and in the articulation of the 
theory of that practice, and to conduct their intellectual and moral warfare.’xcix MacIntyre 
is no doubt happier than Readings to imagine that the ‘intellectual and moral warfare’ he 
envisages might issue in some kind of dialectical progress, but both are agreed that there 
is no unified culture for the university to reproduce, that it must reproduce disunity, and 
that this might be an ethical endeavour.c 
Newman imagined a university in pursuit of universal knowledge. This was not 
the universality of the enlightenment, which resides in the knowing subject who would 
comprehend all things encyclopaedically, but of an older tradition that looked to know 
the universe, and through the universe, the universe’s creator, who alone has universal 
knowledge. The unity of all resides in that which is sought, not in those who seek, who 
can only participate in a ‘science’ that always exceeds them. This tradition is an affront to 
human pride, but not a denial of reason. Indeed faith demands reason because it holds that 
we are given to know by that which we would know: reason is given in the gift of our 
being. At the same time this tradition is contested, but that contestation must be staged 
and elaborated in the university that would not foreclose on the question, but pursue 
universal knowledge, harbour all traditions of enquiry, and be a community of dissensus. 
In this way theology proves to be the measure of a liberal education in the university 
without an idea other than to ask the question (of the universe). And a truly Catholic 
university is but a more intense realization of this, since its asking of the question is not 
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framed by the subject of a universal reason but by the mystery of the universe that is 
given for our learning. 
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